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Abstract—This paper investigates a new information reconcili-
ation method for quantum key distribution in the case where
two parties exchange key in the presence of a malevolent
eavesdropper. We have observed that reconciliation is a special
case of channel coding and for that existing techniques can be
adapted for reconciliation. We describe an explicit reconciliation
method based on Turbo codes. We believe that the proposed
method can improve the efficiency of quantum key distribution
protocols based on discrete quantum states.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cryptography is the art of hiding information in a string
of bits meaningless to any unauthorized party. To achieve
this goal, a message is combined according to an algorithm
with some additional secret information which is the key to
produce a cryptogram. In the traditional terminology, Alice is
the party encrypting and transmitting the message, Bob the
one receiving it, and Eve the malevolent eavesdropper. For a
crypto-system to be considered secure, it should be impossible
to unlock the cryptogram without owning the key.
At this point, quantum key distribution enters the scene by
allowing two physically separated parties to create a random
secret key and to verify that the key has not been intercepted.
The idea is to use bits encoded on individual photons to
exchange cryptographic keys between network users where
the security is based on the laws of physics rather than in
computational complexity (as is the case for the most classical
cryptographic approaches).
This manuscript is organized as follows: In Section 2, we
adress the problem statement. In Section 3, we present an
overview of related works. In Section 4, we describe our
proposed reconciliation method and some conclusions and
perspectives are consequently drawn in Section 5.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT: BB84 PROTOCOL
The first scheme for quantum cryptography was introduced
by Bennett and Brassard [1] in 1984. But, the first experimen-
tal demonstration of the protocol was performed in 1991 using
the polarization states of single photons to transmit a random
key. A basis is chosen to distinguish the two values 0 and 1
without ambiguity. One choice is the rectilinear basis
⊕
where
photons are polarized at angle 0◦ (↔) or 90◦ (l) representing
0 and 1 respectively. Another choice is the diagonal basis
⊗
where 0 is represented by photons polarized at 45◦ (↗) and
1 by photons polarized at 135◦ (↖).
Protocol BB84 like any other protocol of quantum cryptogra-
phy is based on two principal phases: a quantum phase via a
one-way physical quantum channel and a public phase using
an authenticated two-way classic ideal channel. The four steps
of these phases will be illustrated below.
First, Alice sends quantum states to Bob on the quantum
channel and Bob measures these states. On receiving the state,
Bob informs her via public channels of the basis used to
accept each bit. Alice informs Bob, which bits were applied
the correct basis. Then, they discard the incorrect ones and use
the remaining. This process gives the two parties correlated
random variables, called sifted key XA and XB (Fig. 1).
Fig. 1. First step of BB84 protocol [2].
In order to detect eavesdropping, Alice and Bob compare
a sample of the transmitted data throw a classical public
authenticated channel and thus can determine an upper bound
on the amount of information a possible eavesdropper may
have acquired.
Then, a step called reconciliation is done. Alice and Bob
exchange information over the public authenticated channel in
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such a way that Bob can recover XA knowing XB . The ex-
changed information is considered known to an eavesdropper.
Finally, another step is essential and it consists in applying
a privacy amplification protocol to wipe out the enemy’s
information on both quantum and classical transmissions, at
the cost of a reduction in the key length.
It thus appears clearly that reconciliation is crucial and tricky
(we should try to decrease the amount of processus exchanged
information). Hence, the interest of investigating the use of an
efficient reconciliation method in this context. So, in the next
section, we present reported solutions in the literature to tackle
such problem.
III. RELATED WORKS
Several methods of error reconciliation for quantum cryp-
tography have been already reported in the literature. In what
follows, we will only focus on the most employed ones,
such as the best known Cascade algorithm [3], the Binary
algorithm [4], the Winnow algorithm [5], and the Low-Density
Parity-Check code LDPC [6].
Each method have some positive and negative aspects. For
exemple, Cascade and Binary removes a single error and don’t
introduce additional errors to multiple errors block, instead of
the Winnow algorithm because the Hamming algorithm only
reveals one single error in each block. Also, the Cascade and
the Binary require significant more time of communication that
it is proportional to the length of key. While for the winnow
algorithm, communication time only depends on the error rate.
Generally, compared to Cascade method, the LDPC codes can
correct the same range of errors but has the advantage to
improve the safety of the used protocol. This has motivated
our approach to study turbo codes which had been proved to
perform better when compared with LDPC in the literature.
As far as we are concerned by reconciliation method based
on turbo codes, we will describe it in more details in the next
section.
IV. PROPOSED RECONCILIATION QUANTUM KEY
DISTRIBUTION METHOD
Quantum cryptography asserts that the intervention of an
eavesdropper inevitably introduces transmission errors and,
therefore can be detected by legitimate parties. That is why
reconciliation or Error Correction will be necessary for pre-
serving the key against not only eavesdropping, but also
channel noise and other unwanted interactions in quantum
computation and communication.
In our study, we limit our researches to the presence of a
particular type of eavesdropping attack: intercept and resend.
We develop a reconciliation method based on the well known
turbo codes.
We start with a presentation of the turbo code theoretic tool
and a brief explanation of intercept and resend attack principle.
Then, we move to the description of the method and finally
we conclude from experiments.
A. Turbo codes principle
Turbo coding was first introduced in 1993 by Berrou and
al. [7]. It consist on a parallel concatenation of two, or
more, constituent codes separated by one, or more, interleavers
(Fig. 2). The constituent codes are usually two identical
recursive systematic convolutional codes. The input sequence
to be encoded is divided into blocks of length N . Each block
is encoded by the first encoder and interleaved before passing
through the second encoder. Researches have proved that turbo
codes can approach the Shannon limit closer than any other
known forward error correcting code. The efficiency of the
turbo codes is due to the use of an iterative process at the
decoder side and the presence of an interleaver at the encoder
side, which adds randomness-like effect to the code.
Fig. 2. The generic turbo encoder.
The turbo decoder consists of two, or more, Soft-In Soft-Out
(SISO) maximum likelihood decoders (Fig. 3).
Fig. 3. The generic turbo decoder.
Decoders are operating in parallel, exchanging iteratively
extrinsic information. Two families of decoding algorithms are
commonly used in turbo decoding: Soft Output Viterbi Algo-
rithms (SOVA) and Maximum A Posteriori (MAP) algorithms.
The MAP algorithm is more efficient but more complex than
the SOVA. However, simplified versions of this algorithm such
as MAX-Log-MAP and Log-MAP perform almost as well
with a reduced complexity.
In our work, we make the choice to deal with MAX-Log-MAP
decoder as it is the less complex one. The component encoders
are recursive systematic convolutional encoders with generator
polynomials (5, 3). The chosen interleaver is a row-column
interleaver which is can simply described by Fig. 4 (the data
is written row-wise and read columnwise). We performed 20
iterations with data size D = 10000 and block size N = 1000.
Fig. 4. Row-column interleaver.
B. Intercept and resend attack principle
We implement one type of eavesdropping strategy (intercept
and resend) and we experiment our method on its case. Inter-
cept and Resend is the most known eavesdropping strategy
that can be implemented with actual technology means. Eve
replaces Bob by applying random bases measurements to some
qubits and each result will be sent to Bob without any change.
After Alice and Bob public discussion about their bases mea-
surements choices, Eve construct her one by leaving bits that
correspond to Alice and Bob incompatibility measurements.
We define for this eavesdropping strategy the probability s
that one qubit sent by Alice to Bob is eavesdropped.
C. An overview of the proposed method
In our work, we propose to resort to turbo codes to
accomplish reconciliation, more precisely the analysis model
is shown in Fig. 5. Alice and Bob communicate with BB84
protocol and Eve uses intercept and resend attack. The data
sample generated by Alice is firstly encoded and than decoded
in the Bob’s side.
Fig. 5. Proposed reconciliation method model.
D. Experimental results
We have now collected all the ingredients to describe the
results by studying secure information which is an important
parameter defined by [8]:
Is = IAB − IAE ,
where IAB is amount of information exchanged between
Alice and Bob and IAE is the one exchanged between Alice
and Eve.
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We represent in Fig. 6 secure information Is as function
of s-values for intercept and resend eavesdropping. It can
be noted that secure information decreases up to 0 as the
parameter of eavesdropping attack increases to 1. This means
that when Eve accedes to all Alice’s states, Alice and Bob will
no longer have a secret and that is why the protocol should
be stopped.
Fig. 6. Secure Information as function of s-values for Intercept and Resend
eavesdropping.
Fig. 7 shows error probability Pe as function of s-values
for Intercept and Resend eavesdropping.
Fig. 7. Error probability as function of s-values for Intercept and Resend
eavesdropping.
We can see clearly that Pe is a linear function of s. As the
eavesdropper capability to catch Alice’s states increases, we
have an increasing error probability.
V. CONCLUSION
Quantum cryptography allows remote parties to share secret
keys. But the sifted key will contains some errors which are
caused by technical imperfections, as well as possibly by Eve’s
intervention. Such a situation, that the legitimate partners must
be removing the errors by public discussion. Our proposed
method have tried to deal with this issue.
There are many related works that are worth further investi-
gating. First, we can generalize our research by taking into
consideration not only eavesdropping effect, but also channel
noise and other unwanted interactions in quantum computa-
tion and communication. Furthermore, the reconciliation of
discrete random variables has been extensively studied and
many practical and efficient interactive protocols (Cascade,
Winnow) have been designed and are now widely used in
quantum key distribution applications. However little works
have been devoted to the reconciliation of continuous random
variables. Thus, it seems interesting to investigate in this way.
Finally, improvement could be expected by the optimization
of the turbo code.
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